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APPELLATE PROCESS

The judiciary is now under consideration. I view it as you do, as defective both in
its general structure, and many of its particular regulations. The attachment of the
Eastern members, the difficulty of substituting another plan, with the consent of those
who agree in disliking the bill, the defect of time &c. will however prevent any radical
alterations. The most I hope is that some offensive violations of Southern jurisprudence
may be corrected, and that the system may speedily undergo a re-consideration under
the auspices of the Judges who alone will be able perhaps to set it to rights.
-James Madison [1789]
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THE CIRCUIT COURTS HAVE DETERIORATED FROM A PERSONALLY CONDUCTED TO
A BUREAUCRATICALLY CONDUCTED APPELLATE PROCESS.

In drafting Article Three of the United States Constitution, James Madison and his
co-authors did not include methods for efficiently adapting the federal courts to an everevolving caseload.1 This profound lack of direction planted an infection in the federal court
system, a potentially fatal illness called the ³crisis of volume.´2 Politicized federalism has
served as a catalyst, perpetually spreading the infection and exacerbating the crisis.3
The term crisis is a misnomer in this instance, as most crises are temporary
emergencies so pressing that they demand immediate attention and resolution. Ironically,
warnings regarding the ³crisis of volume´ have been neglected for decades.4 This
Comment will address the crisis, which currently plagues the United States Courts of
Appeals (hereinafter ³the Circuits´).5 The Circuits are weighed down by an overwhelming
caseload in the same way Atlas was weighed down by the world; except that Atlas was
never expected to dispense justice effectively while shouldering his burden.6
The Circuits have endured the nagging ³crisis of volume´ because no expedient
manner of adapting the federal courts is mentioned in the United States Constitution. 7 The
Founding Fathers set forth the structure of the legislature in Article One, the executive in
Article Two, and the judiciary in Article Three.8 With significantly less text than those
preceding, Article Three is silent regarding the inner workings of the federal courts, and
the proper measures for maintaining reasonably efficient courts were left to the discretion
of Congress.9 However, the discretion of Congress is often in opposition to the needs of
the federal courts; that opposition is largely caused by a fundamental principle at the heart
of American government, federalism.10
Federalism is the oldest, most pervasive, and politically polarizing debate in
American history.11 Justice O¶Connor, in New York v. United States, described federalism
as a ³constitutional question . . . as old as the Constitution: It consists of discerning the
1. See U.S. CONST. art. III.
2. FED. CTS. STUDY COMM., REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 109 (Apr. 2, 1990). The
term ³crisis of volume´ was used by the Federal Courts Study Committee in its 1990 report to refer to the danger
the judiciary faced under an overwhelming caseload.
3. See generally Stephanie K. Seymour, The Judicial Appointment Process: How Broken Is It?, 39 TULSA
L. REV. 691 (2004) (discussing the politicization of judicial issues, in the context of the appointment process);
Carl M. McGowan, Federalism – Old and New – and the Federal Courts, 70 GEO. L.J. 1421 (1982) (explaining
the ways in which federalism has affected the federal courts).
4. See FED. CTS. STUDY COMM., supra note 2, at 109; Miner µ56, Roger J., Dealing with the Appellate
Caseload Crisis: The Report of the Federal Courts Study Committee Revisited, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 517
(2013) (clarifying that the crisis worsened following the publication of the Federal Courts Study Committee¶s
report).
5. FED. CTS. STUDY COMM., supra note 2, at 109.
6. FED. CTS. STUDY COMM., supra note 2, at 109; ROBIN HARD & H. J. ROSE, THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK
OF GREEK MYTHOLOGY: BASED ON H.J. ROSE¶S HANDBOOK OF GREEK MYTHOLOGY 49 (2004) (providing an
explanation of the Greek myth of Atlas, known for helping the Titans rebel against the Olympians. Zeus punished
Atlas¶ rebellion by mandating that he hold up the sky for eternity).
7. See U.S. CONST. art. III.
8. See U.S. CONST. arts. I±III.
9. See U.S. CONST. art. III.
10. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 149 (1992).
11. Id.
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proper division of authority between the Federal Government and the States.´12 Any
matter that invokes a question of federalism²of where the authority to govern lies²will
be accompanied by the politicization of the issue.13 This Comment refers to those parallel
manifestations of politics and federalism as politicized federalism.
Politicized federalism is rampant in areas of confusion caused by constitutional
silence.14 The absence of provision in Article Three for adapting the courts has meant a
prevalence of politicized federalism in moments when that adaptation is needed. 15 With
politicized federalism acting as a catalyst for the infection, the federal judiciary has been
unable to defend itself, as if there were no judicial immune system at all. 16 Lawmakers
must consider a new approach for addressing the ³crisis of volume,´ and the judiciary
requires its own immune system to ward off future attacks.17
Article Three¶s silence and politicized federalism allow the ³crisis of volume´ to
reverberate throughout each Circuit, without treatment or cure. 18 Since the United States
Supreme Court grants a writ of certiorari in only a handful of cases, the Circuits answer
most legal questions brought before them with finality.19 Therefore, the bulk of stare
decisis originates in the Circuits, which have long been infected by the ³crisis of
volume.´20
The infection has persisted for so long that it has caused serious harm to the
³hallmarks of our judiciary.´21 With politicized federalism preventing necessary
adaptation, the Circuits were unable to preserve those judicial hallmarks.22 The erosion of
judicial hallmarks eventually led to an unplanned evolution in the Circuits, from a
³personally conducted´ appellate process to a ³bureaucratically conducted´ appellate
process.23 The bureaucratic appellate process has had detrimental effects; in light of these,
lawmakers must address the ³crisis of volume´ and ensure that the judiciary is protected
from further harm.24
Part II of this Comment will study an ancestor of the ³crisis of volume´ infection,
the early practice of circuit riding, to demonstrate that the current illness stems from a flaw
12. Id.
13. Jessica Bulman-Pozen, From Sovereignty and Process to Administration and Politics: The Afterlife of
American Federalism, 123 YALE L.J. 1920, 1923 (2014).
14. John F. Manning, Federalism and the Generality Problem in Constitutional Interpretation, 122 HARV.
L. REV. 2003, 2006±08 (2009).
15. Infra Part III.
16. Infra Parts III±IV.
17. FED. CTS. STUDY COMM., supra note 2, at 109.
18. Thomas B. Marvell, Appellate Capacity and Caseload Growth, 16 AKRON L. REV. 43, 59 (1982)
(discussing the growth of appellate caseloads, how those caseloads apply increasing pressure on the Circuits, and
the negative consequences of an appellate court exceeding its capacity).
19. About the Supreme Court, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/educationalresources/about-educational-outreach/activity-resources/about (last visited Sept. 27, 2019).
20. Shay Lavie, Appellate Courts and Caseload Pressure, 27 STAN. L. & POL¶Y REV. 57, 58 (2016)
(discussing the importance of the appellate courts in the federal system and the implications of the crisis of
volume on those courts).
21. FED. CTS. STUDY COMM., supra note 2, at 109.
22. Id.
23. Howard T. Markey, On the Present Deterioration of the Federal Appellate Process: Never Another
Learned Hand, 33 S.D. L. REV. 371, 376±77 (1988).
24. FED. CTS. STUDY COMM., supra note 2, at 109.
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in what could be described as the judiciary¶s DNA, Article Three of the Constitution.
Furthermore, Part II will illustrate the daily challenges legal practitioners experienced in
the early years of the judiciary, through the eyes of a young nineteenth-century attorney,
Abraham Lincoln. Next, Part II will offer background for analysis and provide evidence
of the burden that the early United States Supreme Court justices grudgingly endured, for
over a century, until the practice of circuit riding was finally abolished. Lastly, Part II will
compare the judicial burdens of circuit riding with the modern crisis of volume;
constitutional silence and politicized federalism will be identified as the causes of both
burdens.
Part III will examine the relationship between Congress and the Judiciary in three
steps. First, Part III will look to Article Three and the limited authority its language
delegates to Congress. Next, Part III will provide a brief history of legislative acts that
affected the judicial framework. Lastly, Part III will examine the judiciary¶s efforts to cure
the crisis of volume and will identify politicized federalism as the reason for Congress¶
failure to treat the infection.
Part IV will analyze the crisis of volume as it was described in the Report of the
Federal Courts Study Committee in 1990. Then, Part IV will show that the crisis has
become more severe since that report was released and discuss the harmful consequences
of its current state. Lastly, Part IV will mourn the erosion of the ³personally conducted´
federal appellate process that occurred as a direct result of the crisis of volume; the need
for a new approach to judicial adaptation will be explained.
II.

CIRCUIT RIDING WAS AN EARLY EXAMPLE OF CONGRESS¶ TENDENCY TO HINDER
JUDICIAL ADAPTATION.

There are clear similarities between the current crisis of volume and its now-extinct
ancestor, the practice of circuit riding.25 As Congress statutorily mandated under the
Judiciary Act of 1789, the federal circuit courts were divided into regional jurisdictions.26
For about half of American history, justices of the United States Supreme Court were
assigned to and presided over these regional jurisdictions.27 This arrangement meant that
justices were obligated to travel across frontier country so they could fulfill their duties at
their assigned circuit court.28 The practice consumed an enormous amount of judicial time
and energy, as travel across long distances through largely unsettled terrains by way of
slow, unreliable, and often dangerous means of transportation took its toll. 29
Beyond the difficulties of geography, perceptions of potential unconstitutionality
swirled around the practice, as it left open the possibility of judges rehearing cases at
different levels of the federal court system.30 The original circuit courts were composed
of three-judge panels, which included a district judge from the local community and two

25. Infra Part II.C.
26. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 4, 1 Stat. 73, 74.
27. Id. at 74±75.
28. Id.
29. Joshua Glick, On the Road: The Supreme Court and the History of Circuit Riding, 24 CARDOZO L. REV.
1753, 1765 (2003).
30. Id. at 1794±95.
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circuit riding Supreme Court justices.31 Given the right circumstances, a district judge
could rehear a case they had previously presided over in their district, although the
language of the Judiciary Act of 1789 prohibited a district judge from voting in ³any case
of appeal or error from his own decision . . . ³32 However, if appealed, a decision at the
circuit level could reach the Supreme Court, and a justice that had been involved in the
circuit court¶s decision could hear the matter again.33
Justices of the Supreme Court, raising concerns of the practice¶s impracticality and
perceived unconstitutionality, repeatedly asked Congress to abolish the practice and create
circuit judgeship positions.34 However, as a result of Federalist political motivations, the
early Court could not persuade Congress to end the practice.35 Like the modern crisis of
volume, circuit riding strained the administration of justice in a variety of ways and
persisted for decades despite judges¶ concerns.36 Both circuit riding and the contemporary
crisis of volume were allowed to continue for the same reasons: (1) Article Three of the
Constitution does not provide an adequate avenue for remedying either infection, and (2)
politicized federalism prevented Congress from addressing the negative consequences of
each.37 The circuit riding practice should serve as a reminder that the judiciary¶s current
crisis is not new, but rather the latest manifestation of an old illness.
A. Until Five Score and Nine Years Ago, Circuit Riding Plagued the Federal Judiciary.
The practice of circuit riding infected the judiciary for over a century.38 Attorneys
and judges trekked through wild landscapes to uphold order in the courts, enduring frontier
travel over vast distances.39 Among these frontier practitioners was Abraham Lincoln, a
young circuit riding attorney from Illinois.40 Lincoln practiced in the Eighth Circuit of
Illinois±not a federal jurisdiction±but the daily challenges of circuit riding were similar at
the state and federal levels.41 Lincoln¶s career is an interesting example of the circuit riding
practice.42
It is commonly known that Lincoln was a practicing attorney before his presidency,
but the nature of his time practicing law is rarely discussed outside the wood-paneled
offices of legal scholars and historians. 43 Rather than being confined to a prestigious law
firm, Lincoln chose to be a traveling practitioner and received considerably less pay for

31. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 4, 1 Stat. 73, 74±75.
32. Id. at 75.
33. Glick, supra note 29, at 1794±95.
34. Id. at 1777.
35. Id. at 1777±78. Justice Iredell wrote to his wife, Hannah, in 1796 upon realization that Congress would
not abolish circuit riding, stating ³[w]e are still doomed, I fear, to be wretched Drudges.´ Id. at 1778.
36. Id. at 1767. (explaining the justices¶ desire to change the system before ³institutional ossification´ set in)
(quoting 1 JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: ANTECEDENTS AND
BEGINNINGS TO 1801, at 554 (Paul A. Freund gen. ed., 1971)).
37. Infra Part II.C.
38. Glick, supra note 29, at 1754, 1755.
39. Id. at 1757.
40. ALBERT A. WOLDMAN, LAWYER LINCOLN 82 (2001).
41. Id. at 85.
42. See generally id.
43. Id. at 6.
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his efforts.44 Lincoln was admitted to the Illinois Bar on September 9, 1836.45 He practiced
law as a circuit rider, which meant he traveled a geographical circuit to statutorily
designated locations where court was held. 46 Lincoln¶s reputation as an elite orator was
arguably first cultivated when he returned to circuit riding in Illinois after a brief period
running for the state¶s legislature.47
In the Eighth Circuit of Illinois, Lincoln was well-known and witnessed the ongoing
overhaul of the state¶s court system.48 David Davis, an attorney Lincoln knew well, was
elected to the Supreme Court of Illinois, taking on the Eighth Circuit jurisdiction and its
requisite circuit riding duties.49 For most of Lincoln¶s legal career, the Eighth Circuit was
composed of fourteen counties, which were still largely unsettled. 50 The daily challenges
of practicing law while riding circuit are completely foreign to attorneys today. 51
Lincoln¶s traveling companions were fellow prominent attorneys and judges of the
time, as he was part of the ³µbig five¶ of this early horseback circuit.´52 The ³big five´
consisted of Abraham Lincoln, John Stuart, Stephen Logan, David Davis, and Edward
Baker, all renowned for their prowess in the legal profession. 53 Davis, later appointed by
Lincoln as a justice of the United States Supreme Court, wrote to family about his
experiences traveling the circuit, explaining in one letter that he and his traveling
companions were ³deluged by rain [that] spring. The windows of heaven [were] certainly
44. Id. at 82.
45. Lawyer Profile of Abraham Lincoln, ATT¶Y REGISTRATION & DISCIPLINARY COMM¶N OF THE SUP. CT.
OF ILL., https://www.iardc.org/ (follow ³Lawyer Search´ hyperlink; then search last name field for ³Lincoln´
and search first name field for ³Abraham´).
46. Circuit Riding, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/timeline/circuit-riding (last visited Sept. 15,
2019).
47. WOLDMAN, supra note 40, at 82.
48. Id. at 85±86; Lincoln¶s admittance to the bar in 1836 came at a critical time for Illinois¶ courts, and
Lincoln had a front row seat to the judicial evolution of his home state. Timeline of Judicial History, NINETEENTH
JUD. CIRCUIT CT., 19thcircuitcourt.state.il.us/1289/Timeline-of-Judicial-History (last visited Sept. 11, 2019).
The Supreme Court of Illinois Territory and the county courts were established in 1814; the state¶s supreme court
judges had jurisdiction over civil and criminal matters, along with the responsibility of each to ride their own
circuits. Id. A few years later in 1818, Illinois became the twenty-first state to enter the Union, and the state¶s
constitution established its judicial system. Id. The state¶s circuit courts remained under the jurisdiction of the
Illinois Supreme Court judges until 1835, when circuit judgeships were created, and the Illinois Supreme Court
justices were relieved of their circuit duties. Id. In 1841, Illinois¶ legislature abolished the circuit judgeships and,
again, required the justices to ride circuit. Id. The creation and subsequent abolition of circuit judgeships also
occurred at the federal level. Infra Part III.B.ii.
49. WOLDMAN, supra note 40, at 81. In 1841, Judge Samuel H. Treat was elected to the Supreme Court of
Illinois and presided over the Eighth Circuit, holding court for two days at a time, twice annually, in each county
under his jurisdiction. Id.
50. Id. at 87.
51. Guy C. Fraker, The Real Lincoln Highway: The Forgotten Lincoln Circuit Markers, 25 J. ABRAHAM
LINCOLN ASS¶N 76, 76 (Winter 2004).
The riders are on the road from Metamora, the seat of Woodford County, to Bloomington, seat of
McLean County. They are in the vicinity of the county line. Other than an occasional farmstead and
a rare passing rider, they have seen no other sign of settlement for some time. As they ride, their
conversation is accompanied by the whistle of quail, interrupted by the flushing of grouse. They have
seen retreating wolves keeping their distance, and they have frequently startled deer from their grassy
hiding places.
Id.
52. WOLDMAN, supra note 40, at 80.
53. Id.
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open. Bad roads, broken bridges, swimming of horses and constant wettings [were] the
main incidents in Western travel.´54
The Eighth Circuit covered about one-fifth of Illinois.55 Judge Davis held court in
all of its fourteen counties, which entailed a round trip of approximately 500 miles. 56
Lincoln and Judge Davis were the only members of the Illinois Bar that consistently
travelled to all of the counties in the Eighth Circuit.57 On horseback, Lincoln would set
out for the circuit carrying ³his saddle-bags stuffed with documents and a few changes of
lighter apparel, a huge weatherbeaten cotton umbrella to shelter him from the elements,
and a law book or two, to be gone for weeks at a stretch.´58 The Eighth Circuit educated
Lincoln, provided him with myriad lessons in legal practice, and prepared him for political
challenges to come.59
It could be argued that Lincoln¶s humble beginnings riding the Eighth Circuit in
Illinois molded him into the man that history now applauds.60 The unique and burdensome
challenges of circuit riding required both trail-smarts and book-smarts.61 A camaraderie
formed between Lincoln and his colleagues as they tackled these challenges together, and
Lincoln¶s ability to lead in trial or on trail made him a well-rounded practitioner.62 Lincoln
and his peers encountered an array of challenges in their circuit travels. 63 For instance:
Lincoln¶s extremely long legs caused his circuit-riding companions to appoint him as scout
in testing the depth of the streams. By taking off his boots and stockings and rolling up his
trousers he could easily find the shallow crossing-places and lead his cronies through the
current. On one occasion after a severe rainstorm, a party of itinerant lawyers, including
Judge Davis, stripped naked and with their clothes thrown in bundles over their shoulders,
mounted their horses, and led by the gigantic, rawboned Lincoln, crossed the flood. 64

54. Id. (quoting Letter from David Davis to Julius Rockewelle (May 14, 1844), in HARRY EDWARD PRATT,
TRANSACTIONS OF THE ILLINOIS HISTORICAL SOCIETY 162, 162±63 (1930)).
55. Id. at 81.
56. Id.
57. WOLDMAN, supra note 40, at 82.
58. Id.
59. ROGER L. SEVERNS, PRAIRIE JUSTICE: A HISTORY OF ILLINOIS COURTS UNDER FRENCH, ENGLISH, AND
AMERICAN LAW 172 (John A. Lupton ed., 2015). Many of Lincoln¶s greatest challenges would be dealt from a
stack of cards held by an old friend, Stephen H. Douglas, who grew up alongside Lincoln. Id. They received their
educations from the same school; the pair were friends and, at times, fervent rivals in their careers. Id. Lincoln
and Douglas also went by Big Sucker and Little Giant, respectively, nicknames they obtained early in their
careers as clear references to their starkly different statures. Id. Lincoln spent the majority of his early career
practicing law, notwithstanding a brief period running for the Senate of Illinois. Id. He suffered defeat to none
other than Douglas, in the famous Lincoln-Douglas debates, and thus returned home to the Eighth Circuit. Id.
Douglas was already a judge on the Supreme Court of Illinois, and now he had defeated Lincoln in a race to the
Illinois Senate. Id. Honest Abe returned home from that battle defeated, but he was undoubtedly triumphant in
the war. Id. With a reputation that now had national appeal, he became the Republican Party¶s candidate in the
next presidential election. Id. Big Sucker would go on to win that election, becoming the sixteenth President of
the United States of America and, undeniably, one of the greatest Presidents the American Republic has had the
privilege of electing. Now, in the law library at the University of Tulsa, College of Law, Lincoln¶s statue stands
about fifty feet from the desk at which this Comment was drafted.
60. WOLDMAN, supra note 40, at 5±6.
61. Id. at 80.
62. Id. at 83±84.
63. Id. at 80.
64. Id. at 82±83.
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Lincoln represents an array of practitioners who rode circuit in the frontier of
American law, clearing a path for future generations of attorneys and judges. 65 Although
Lincoln rode circuit at the state level, judges also endured the circuit riding practice in
federal jurisdictions, including justices of the United States Supreme Court.66
B. The Supreme Court Endured Circuit Riding for Over a Century.
In their circuit duties, justices of the nation¶s highest Court endured the same type
of perilous travel as was required of Lincoln in Illinois. 67 Two justices of the Supreme
Court traveled twice each year to a circuit where they sat on a panel, along with a district
judge of the state with original jurisdiction.68 About a half-century before Lincoln¶s career
began, the Judiciary Act of 1789 established three federal circuit jurisdictions: the Eastern
Circuit, the Middle Circuit, and the Southern Circuit. 69 Each of these three jurisdictions
posed unique challenges to its presiding justices; the Eastern and Middle Circuits were
relatively well-established, but the Southern Circuit was largely frontier at the time.70
Beyond the issues of landscape and geography, the physical health of the justices posed
additional challenges, as older justices struggled with the hardships of strenuous travel.71
To further complicate matters, the time required for justices to complete their circuit duties
meant spending nearly half a year away from their responsibilities back home.72
Justices of the early Supreme Court strongly opposed the practice of circuit riding,
as it required an extraordinary amount of frontier travel at a time when transportation was
anything but comfortable.73 The first Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, John Jay, even
wrote to President George Washington describing the difficulties of riding circuit and
requesting that Washington ask Congress to address the issue. 74 Riding circuit was so
despised amongst the early Supreme Court justices that ³the first Court agreed to take a
reduction in salary in exchange for Congress appointing a separate circuit judiciary.´75
Still, a primarily Federalist Congress refused to address the justices¶ circuit riding
concerns.76 Instead of listening to the Court¶s pleas for change, Congress asked the
Attorney General to review and report on whether the procedure required modification. 77
At that time, the Supreme Court did not have the power to choose which cases

65. The discussion in this section of President Lincoln¶s experiences riding circuit in Illinois should serve as
an illustration for the subsequent section, where the circuit riding practice is examined at the federal level, and
those enduring hardships are justices of the Supreme Court of the United States.
66. Glick, supra note 29, at 1754.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1757.
69. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 4, 1 Stat. 73, 74±75.
70. Glick, supra note 29, at 1765.
71. Id. at 1766.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1754.
74. Id. at 1768.
75. Glick, supra note 29, at 1754.
76. Id. at 1769.
77. Id. Congress has a tendency to hear the judiciary¶s pleas for change, assign officials to report on the issue,
and subsequently never follow up on the report. For more recent examples, see FED. CTS. STUDY COMM., supra
note 2; FED. JUD. CTR., infra note 249.

Published by TU Law Digital Commons,

9

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 56 [], Iss. 1, Art. 7

118

TULSA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:109

deserved its attention.78 Rather, Congress dictated which cases and controversies would
be heard by the Court after appeal from the district or circuit courts. 79 The justices often
heard the same case during the course of their circuit duties and later on appeal to the
Supreme Court.80 At first, the Circuits were primarily trial courts of original jurisdiction;
thus, a justice could serve as both a trial and an appellant judge in the same case.81 Justices
typically recused themselves from cases they had previously presided over.82 However,
this was not always true as all available justices were sometimes required to participate in
a case for a quorum to exist.83
The early Court made the most of its circuit duties, spreading judicial influence and
setting the stage for American jurisprudence while on the circuit. 84 Justices often
expressed legal theories at the circuit level that they would later elaborate in opinions of
the highest Court.85 For example, in discussing the prototype principle of judicial review,
Justice Chase explained that ³some of the judges [had] individually in the Circuits decided
that the Supreme Court [could] declare an Act of Congress to be unconstitutional, and
therefore invalid, but there [was] no adjudication of the Supreme Court itself upon this
point.´86
The early Supreme Court justices complied with their statutory obligation to ride
circuit, but their compliance should not be construed as consent.87 Rather, the early Court
had no other choice.88 Possessing the power neither of the purse nor of the sword, the
Court was relatively weak and uncertain of its authority. 89 Unfortunately, the early
Congress was quite sure of its powers and had little incentive to wield them in favor of the
judiciary.90
C. Congress Is Historically Uncooperative When Adaptation Is Needed in the Circuits.
The early Congress regarded the circuit riding practice as an apparatus for furthering
Federalist ideals.91 Congress believed ³circuit riding transformed the justices into
µrepublican schoolmaster[s],¶´ endowed with federal authority and the ability to disperse
national political views amongst the states. 92 At a time when the competing principles of
Federalism and Anti-Federalism dominated American politics, Federalists viewed the

78. Glick, supra note 29, at 1761.
79. Id. at 1762.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1762±63.
83. Glick, supra note 29, at 1763.
84. See Cooper v. Telfair, 4 U.S. 14 (4 Dall. 1800) (dealing with the issue of judicial review, at the circuit
level, three years prior to the Court¶s decision in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1 Cranch 1803)).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 19.
87. Glick, supra note 29, at 1755.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1754.
92. Glick, supra note 29, at 1754.
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practice of circuit riding as a means of advancing their political philosophy. 93 From a
Federalist perspective, there was value in the highest Court¶s justices riding circuit because
they ³could lecture the local citizens not only on the relevant law, but also on the nature
of centralized government, the responsibility of the citizenry, and the ways in which the
new government served their needs.´94 Furthermore, ³[f]avorable public opinion was
necessary to ensure the survival of the young Republic and the active and visible presence
of the justices would help foster loyalty toward the new form of government and somewhat
weaken the people¶s previous allegiance to their state¶s government.´95
When the Judiciary Act of 1789 was enacted, the United States House of
Representatives and Senate were both controlled by the Pro-Administration party, an early
name attributed to Federalist ideals.96 The first Senate was composed of eighteen ProAdministration and eight Anti-Administration senators, while the first House of
Representatives consisted of thirty-seven Pro-Administration and twenty-eight AntiAdministration representatives.97 Since the Federalist, or Pro-Administration, ideology
benefited from justices riding circuit, there was little political incentive to end the practice,
despite the justices¶ complaints.98
The highest Court in America rode circuit for over a hundred years. 99 There were
two prominent issues raised by justices during this period.100 Justices dealt with ³serious
physical hardships during the burgeoning days of the Republic . . . [and] found it
impossible to attend simultaneously to the ever-growing docket of the Supreme Court and
to their circuit duties.´101 Nonetheless, it is apparent that the young American judiciary
was powerless to modify its own procedures without a cooperative Congress. 102
Those hoping to end circuit riding sought recourse in the courts when efforts to do
so in Congress proved futile.103 The constitutionality of circuit riding was questioned in
Stuart v. Laird.104 Justice Patterson, writing for the Court, gently alluded to Congress¶
refusal to abolish circuit riding.105 Patterson identified the quarrels of the Federalist and

93. Id.
94. Id. at 1760.
95. Id.
96. See Party Division, U.S. SENATE, senate.gov/history/partydiv.htm (last visited Sept. 16, 2019); Party
Divisions of the House of Representatives, 1789 to Present, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
history.house.gov/Institution/Party-Divisions/Party-Divisions/ (last visited Sept. 16, 2019).
97. See sources cited supra note 96.
98. Glick, supra note 29, at 1754.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1755.
103. See Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. 299 (1 Cranch 1803).
104. Id. at 305 (elucidating that ³[b]esides, as judge of the supreme court, he could not exercise the duties or
jurisdiction assigned to the court of the fifth circuit, because, by the constitution of the United States, the supreme
court has only appellate jurisdiction; except in the two cases where a state or foreign minister shall be a party.
The jurisdiction of the supreme court, therefore, being appellate only, no judge of that court, as such, is authorized
to hold a court of original jurisdiction. No act of congress can extend the original jurisdiction of the supreme
court beyond the bounds limited by the constitution.´ This opinion comes shortly after and in response to the
Judiciary Act of 1802, which again gave the Supreme Court justices jurisdiction over the circuit courts, after the
Judiciary Act of 1801 had delegated circuit court jurisdiction to circuit judges a year earlier.).
105. Id. at 304. Congress was not the first to pass legislation that required judicial officials to ride circuit.
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Anti-Federalist parties in the early Congress as clear causes of that refusal. 106 Discussing
Article Three, Patterson explained that ³[t]his provision of the constitution was intended
to place the judges not only beyond the reach of executive power . . . but also to shield
them from the attack of that party spirit which always predominates in popular
assemblies.´107 The Court held that the practice of circuit riding was constitutional, but
the preceding portion of the opinion appears to illustrate the judiciary and legislature¶s
strained relationship when attempting to adapt the federal courts. 108
Congress ignored the practical disadvantages and embraced the political value of
circuit riding, as the legislative body perceived a need for national politicians to remain in
touch with citizens at the local level.109 In the young Republic, citizens were ³dependent
upon court sessions to receive the news of the day, or to learn about and discuss the doings
of the politicians.´110 As Congress valued the political benefits of circuit riding justices,
it mandated the continuance of the practice, and the concerns of those in the judiciary were
simply not enough to convince Congress to act on the issue. 111 The same trend holds true
today, as the crisis of volume, despite significant warnings issued by federal judges, has
yet to be addressed.112
III. CONSTITUTIONAL SILENCE AND POLITICIZED FEDERALISM HAVE PREVENTED
EFFICIENT ADAPTATION SINCE THE JUDICIARY¶S FOUNDING.
A. The Constitution Does Not Provide a Method for Adapting the Federal Courts Over
Time.
The foregoing discussion raises the question: Where did the early Congress obtain
its authority to dictate the internal procedures of the judiciary? The text of the Constitution
does not provide an answer113; rather, its language established the Court, announced its
jurisdiction (both actual and potential), and limited the legislature¶s authority over that
jurisdiction.114 An examination of the Constitution¶s language does not warrant the
conclusion, or even justify an inference, that Congress has power over the internal
Circuit riding was first implemented in thirteenth-century England, when, under duress from the freemen, King
John signed the Magna Carta. One provision of the famous charter declared that the ³chief justiciary, shall send
two justiciaries through every county four times a year, who, with the four knights chosen out of every shire by
the people, shall hold the said assizes in the county, on the day and at the place appointed.´ English Translation
of Magna Carta, BRITISH LIBR. (July 28, 2014), https://www.bl.uk/magna-carta/articles/magna-carta-englishtranslation.
106. 5 U.S. at 304.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 309 (elaborating that ³[a]nother reason for reversal is, that the judges of the supreme court have no
right to sit as circuit judges, not being appointed as such, or in other words, that they ought to have distinct
commissions for that purpose. To this objection, which is of recent date, it is sufficient to observe, that practice
and acquiescence under it for a period of several years, commencing with the organization of the judicial system,
affords an irresistible answer, and has indeed fixed the constructions.´ This disposition follows pages of analysis
where the Court seemed to outline the unconstitutionality of circuit riding.).
109. Henry C. Clark, Circuit Riding a Former National Asset, 8 A.B.A. J. 772, 774 (1922).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. See Markey, supra note 23, at 377.
113. See U.S. CONST. art. III.
114. Id.
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procedures of the Court.115
When the National Constitutional Convention toiled over the principles that would
outline a new experimental government, it easily reached the conclusion that a federal
judiciary was imperative.116 An independent federal judiciary was necessary in the
democratic system, and it was clear that the supreme interpreter of laws needed separation
from both the creator and the enforcer of laws.117 However, the Convention did find cause
for debate regarding the organization of the federal judiciary. 118 The Federalists desired
far-reaching national authority in the federal courts, while the Anti-Federalists wished for
localized federal courts and judges with ties to the local community.119
The following excerpt of Article Three describes the full scope of authority that
Congress was given over the judiciary:
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such
inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The Judges . . .
shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their
Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office
....
. . . In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate
Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as
the Congress shall make.
....
The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment; shall be by Jury; and such Trial
shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been committed; but when not
committed within any State, the Trial shall be at such Place or Places as the Congress may
by Law have directed.120

This text delegates only a handful of authorities to Congress, in their respective
order: Congress may ordain and establish inferior courts,121 suspend justices when they
fail to maintain good behavior,122 determine the compensation of justices,123 and regulate
any extension of the Court¶s appellate jurisdiction under exceptions Congress chooses to
establish.124
The language stating that Congress ³may from time to time ordain and establish´
inferior courts seems to warrant the inference that the authors of the Constitution predicted
the inevitable need to expand and adapt the court system over time. 125 However, no
portion of Article Three expressly grants Congress authority over the procedures for

115. Id.
116. MULLER, WILLIAM HENRY, EARLY HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL SUPREME COURT 13 (1922).
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. GORDON S. WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY: A HISTORY OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC, 1789±1815, at 409 (2011).
120. U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1±2 (emphasis added to indicate text relevant to Congress¶ authority).
121. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (³from time to time,´ an early indicator that the Founding Fathers understood
there would be an inevitable need to adapt the courts).
122. Id.
123. Id (but not ³diminish´ that compensation during their time in office).
124. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (providing for the limiting of extensions to appellate jurisdiction that Congress
chooses to give the Court).
125. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.

Published by TU Law Digital Commons,

13

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 56 [], Iss. 1, Art. 7

TULSA LAW REVIEW

122

[Vol. 56:109

adapting or expanding the judiciary.126 This authority is distinct from Congress¶ authority
over the expansion or limitation of jurisdiction in inferior courts. 127
Rather, Congress assumed this authority as falling under its power of the purse,
because Article Three did not say otherwise.128 Since the courts often need pecuniary
resources to expand or adapt with their caseloads, Congress is the inevitable gatekeeper
for such efforts.129 However, due to politicized federalism, the gates rarely open.130
Congress, composed of a body of elected officials in a state of perpetual feud between
Federalists and Anti-Federalists, failed to provide assistance to the courts for fear of
advancing the opposition¶s political stance.131 While this tendency was not protected
against in the text of the Constitution, it cannot necessarily be concluded that it was
condoned by its authors.132
B. Judicial Acts Illustrate the Ineffective Relationship Between the Judiciary and
Congress.
Notwithstanding the absence of direction in Article Three, there were nonetheless
periods when expansion and adaptation of the courts were required to keep up with the
caseloads they faced at a given time in the nation¶s history. The relevant legislative
measures often were rushed, lacked foresight, or catered more to political goals than the
judiciary¶s requested needs.133 All of the judicial acts were affected in some manner or
other by politicized federalism, but some were enacted in such a way as to render them
more harmful than helpful to the judiciary.134 Congress has consistently failed to expand
or adapt the federal courts as needed throughout the nation¶s history, as illustrated by the
following relevant legislation.135
i. The Judiciary Act of 1789 Established a Flawed Federal Court System.
After the states ratified the Constitution, the primary goal of the newly established
Congress upon entering office was drafting a judicial bill; a committee led by Oliver
Ellsworth was entrusted with this responsibility.136 Since Article Three of the Constitution
only vaguely outlined the judicial framework, Ellsworth¶s committee had no direction for

126. See generally U.S. CONST. art. III.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. G. Gregg Webb & Keith E. Whittington, Judicial Independence, the Power of the Purse, and Inherent
Judicial Powers, 88 JUDICATURE 12, 13 (2005).
130. Infra Part II.C.
131. Id.
132. Surrency, The Judiciary Act of 1801, 2 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 53, 64 (1958).
133. Infra Part III.B.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. WOOD, supra note 119, at 408±09. Ellsworth played a key role in shaping the first draft of the
Constitution. Specifically, he helped draft the Connecticut Compromise, creating a bicameral legislature with the
states being equally represented in the Senate. Seven years after his work establishing the federal court system,
in 1796, Ellsworth became the Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court. Senator Ellsworth’s Judiciary
Act, U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/minute/Senator_Ellsworths_Judiciary_Act.htm
(last visited Mar. 7, 2020).
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drafting the specific structure of the judiciary.137 In a void of constitutional guidance, the
committee could shape the judicial framework however it saw fit. 138 However, the
committee had to consider both Federalist desires and Anti-Federalist concerns to ensure
its bill would be enacted.139
At one end of the spectrum, Federalists desired a far-reaching federal judicial
power.140 They advocated for implementation of several district courts and judges, all
capable of enforcing federal law. 141 Federalists envisioned the judiciary as a means of
transmitting their ideals throughout the nation and a necessary instrumentality for pushing
back against innate state loyalties. 142 At the other end of the spectrum, Anti-Federalists
sought a limited judicial authority, believing the states fully capable of enforcing federal
law within their borders.143 Because federal judges were appointed, rather than popularly
elected, Anti-Federalists deemed them inherently un-democratic.144
So, in drafting the Judiciary Act of 1789 (³1789 Act´), Ellsworth¶s committee
searched for middle ground between two starkly contrasting political positions.145 This
meant that the 1789 Act contained several protections against Anti-Federalists
concerns.146 Furthermore, the Bill of Rights was enacted around the same time and
protected individual rights from government encroachment.147 These assurances of
individual liberty allowed the 1789 Act to receive enough political support from both
parties for ratification.148
The 1789 Act established a tiered system of federal courts, which consisted of the
Supreme Court, circuit courts, and district courts. 149 Circuit and district courts served as
the ³inferior courts´ alluded to in Article Three; however, the Act only prescribed judges
to the district courts.150 Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist once remarked, ³[f]ew
lawyers and law students are aware that the Judiciary Act of 1789 created circuit courts
but no circuit judges.´151 Ellsworth¶s committee responded to an immense weight of
political pressure²specifically Anti-Federalists against an excess of federal judges²
more than it tailored a judiciary around sound policies of efficiency; the foresight to
include long-term bulwarks against erosion of judicial hallmarks, while it may have been
present in some members, could not outweigh the party spirit of the legislative body as a
whole.152 The system¶s potential impracticality was overlooked, as both political parties
137. WOOD, supra note 119, at 409.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. WOOD, supra note 119, at 409.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 408.
145. Id. at 409.
146. WOOD, supra note 119, at 409.
147. Id.; see U.S. CONST. amends. I±X.
148. WOOD, supra note 119, at 409.
149. Id.; see Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 4, 1 Stat. 73, 74±75.
150. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73.
151. Glick, supra note 29, at 1754 (quoting 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES, 1790±1800: THE JUSTICES ON CIRCUIT: 1790±1794, at xxv (Maeva Marcus ed., 1988)).
152. Eduardo C. Robreno, Learning to Do Justice: An Essay on the Development of the Lower Federal Courts
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understood that a federal judiciary needed to be established immediately.153 But this
hurried ratification raises the questions: What compromises were made, and were there
negative consequences?
The 1789 Act required the Circuits to hold jury trials as courts of law and equity.154
As noted earlier, trials in these courts were conducted by a panel of three judges. 155 Two
circuit riding Supreme Court justices would travel to the site of circuit court trials, and a
district judge completed the panel.156 Structuring the circuit courts in this compromised
fashion meant that justices of the highest Court were mandated to endure the same kind of
perilous travel as Lincoln, discussed earlier.157
Supreme Court justices endured the circuit riding practice for over a century, despite
the physical strain of traveling long distances and the exorbitant amount of time the
practice consumed.158 In assessing the structure of the federal courts set forth in the 1789
Act, one author concluded that ³[t]he Judiciary Act of 1789 was never satisfactory to
anyone, least of all the litigant who had to depend upon the success of the justice of the
Supreme Court in braving the elements of his travels . . . ³159 It is clear that the physical
impracticality of requiring such strenuous travel took its toll on the judiciary. 160 Because
Congress did not address the impracticalities of circuit riding, ³[t]he administration of
justice on this basis was limited by the tedium of poor transportation, and the vagaries of
inclement weather.´161
A host of judges voiced concerns of the 1789 Act¶s potential unconstitutionality.162
Many believed that the judicial framework was incompatible with the Constitution,
primarily because of instances where a judge might hear a case for a second time after
appeal from an earlier decision.163 This could occur if a district judge¶s opinion was
appealed, as that same district judge could be a member of the three-judge panel at a circuit
court trial.164 Moreover, Supreme Court justices could hear a case while sitting in panel at
the circuit level, and later they might rehear the same case if it came before the Supreme
Court.165
The 1789 Act was indicative of the rampant politicized federalism of the time, and
the resulting judicial system was inherently flawed as a result. 166 Whether based on
grounds of practicality or unconstitutionality, the 1789 Act established a federal court

in the Early Years of the Republic, 29 RUTGERS L. J. 555, 561 (1998).
153. Id.
154. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78±79.
155. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 4, 1 Stat. 73, 74±75.
156. Id.
157. See Glick, supra note 29, at 1754.
158. Id.
159. Surrency, supra note 132, at 58.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 58±59.
163. Id.
164. Surrency, supra note 132, at 58.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 58±59 (discussing a variety of concerns regarding the Judiciary Act of 1789 raised by judges at
different levels of the judiciary).
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structure that many found irrational.167 In hindsight, the only logical explanation for the
inherently flawed system is that politicized federalism manifested itself between Congress
and the judiciary, and the courts suffered as a result.
Only ten days prior to the Act becoming law on September 24, 1789, James Madison
lamented the inadequacies of the bill with Edmund Pendleton, a fellow Federalist, member
of the Continental Congress, and signer of the Constitution:
The judiciary is now under consideration. I view it as you do, as defective both in its general
structure, and many of its particular regulations. The attachment of the Eastern members, the
difficulty of substituting another plan, with the consent of those who agree in disliking the
bill, the defect of time &c. will however prevent any radical alterations. The most I hope is
that some offensive violations of Southern jurisprudence may be corrected, and that the
system may speedily undergo a reconsideration under the auspices of the Judges who alone
will be able perhaps to set it to rights.168

In other words, the author of the United States Constitution recognized the flaws of
the judiciary before the 1789 Act was enacted.169 Possessing a keen eye for long-term
consequences, Madison identified flaws in the structure of the proposed system and also
in its specific procedural provisions.170 His concerns stemmed from what he perceived to
be inevitabilities, such as the need for new courts and the predictable failure of Congress
to provide those courts due to politicized federalism.171 James Madison, more than
familiar with the underpinning philosophies of the new experimental government,
considered the judges of the new system responsible for ³set[ting] it to rights.´172
James Madison, the father of the Constitution, knew that Congress would be
unhelpful to the judiciary and even predicted the reason²referred to by a new name in
this Comment²politicized federalism.173 In describing the entrenched nature of warring
political factions in the legislature, Madison went on to explain, ³[t]he difficulty of uniting
the minds of men accustomed to think and act differently can only be conceived by those
who have witnessed it.´174
ii. The Judiciary Acts of 1801 and 1802 Demonstrate How Politicized Federalism
Harms the Federal Courts.
The imperfections of the judiciary established under the 1789 Act were apparent,
and Congress often revisited the organization of the courts.175 Between the passage of the
167. Id.
168. Letter from James Madison to Edmund Pendleton (Sept. 14, 1789) (on file with the National Archives
and accessible at https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-12-02-0258) (written ten days before the
ratification of the Judiciary Act of 1789) (³&c´ being a Latin term equivalent to ³etc.´).
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. See Letter from James Madison to Edmund Pendleton, supra note 168.
174. Id.
175. Surrency, supra note 132, at 59. In discussing the Judiciary Act of 1789, the Supreme Court justices wrote
a letter to President Washington, stating:
[t]hat when the present Judicial arrangements took place, it appeared to be a general and well founded
opinion, that the Act then passed was to be considered rather as introducing a temporary expedient,
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1789 Act and the Judiciary Act of 1801 (³1801 Act´), Congress passed a total of thirtyseven acts that affected the organization, place, or time of court sessions in some
manner.176 However, any significant changes to the organization of the judiciary would
implicate partisan considerations, as was the case when the 1801 Act was proposed. 177
The 1801 Act was steeped in political controversy, flowing directly from the
perpetual feud between Federalists and Anti-Federalists.178 John Adams, a Federalist,
occupied the presidency when the legislation was enacted, and the Act¶s creation of new
circuit courts allowed him to fill several positions with Federalist judges.179 Trials in the
circuit courts had been conducted by three-judge panels, consisting of two Supreme Court
justices and a local district judge.180 Now, the 1801 Act created a new system composed
of six circuit courts.181 Each of these new circuit courts would employ a panel of three
judges, positions that had previously been filled by circuit riding Supreme Court justices
and a local district judge.182 In adding six circuits to the federal court system, the 1801
Act created sixteen circuit judgeships, and President Adams rushed to fill the vacancies in
those newly created circuit courts with Federalist judges. 183
Anti-Federalists, who rallied behind Thomas Jefferson, heavily criticized the 1801
Act, as it was wholly incompatible with their ideology.184 Jefferson believed the new
federal court structure as laid out under the 1801 Act would be utilized to implement
Federalist principles.185 Infuriated by the actions of President Adams and an oppositioncontrolled Congress, Jefferson ³had no doubt that the Federalist Judiciary Act of 1801 was
than a permanent System, and that it would be revised as soon as a period of greater leisure should
arrive.
The justices further explained:
[t]hat the task of holding twenty seven circuit Courts a year, in the different States, from New
Hampshire to Georgia, besides two Sessions of the Supreme Court at Philadelphia, in the two most
severe seasons of the year, is a task which considering the extent of the United States, and the small
number of Judges, is too burthensome.
Letter from Supreme Court Justices to President George Washington (Aug. 9, 1792) (on file with the National
Archives and accessible at https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-10-02-0425).
176. Surrency, supra note 132, at 64.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 53.
179. Id. at 53±54.
180. Id. at 56.
181. Compare Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 4, 1 Stat. 73, 74±75 (stating ³[t]hat the before mentioned
districts . . . shall be divided into three circuits . . . and that there shall be held annually in each district of said
circuits, two courts, which shall be called Circuit Courts, and shall consist of any two justices of the Supreme
Court, and the district judge of such districts, any two of whom shall constitute a quorum . . . ´), with Judiciary
Act of 1801, ch. 4, § 6, 2 Stat. 89, 90 (stating ³[t]hat the said districts shall be classed into six circuits . . . there
shall be in each of the aforesaid circuits . . . three judges of the United States, to be called circuit judges, one of
whom shall be commissioned as chief judge; and that there shall be a circuit court of the United States, in and
for each of the aforesaid circuits, to be composed of the circuit judges . . . ´).
182. Judiciary Act of 1801, ch. 4, § 7, 2 Stat. 89, 90.
183. Id. Only sixteen circuit judgeships were created under the legislation rather than eighteen because of the
unique structure of the sixth circuit under the 1801 Act. Five of the six newly created circuits would be composed
of three-judge panels, while the sixth circuit would be composed of ³a circuit judge, and the judges of the district
courts of Kentucky and Tennessee; the duty of all of whom it shall be to attend, but any two of whom shall form
a quorum . . . ³ Id.
184. Surrency, supra note 132, at 53.
185. Id.
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a µparasitical plant engrafted at the last session on the judiciary body,¶ a plant that had to
be lopped off.´186
Senator Breckenridge, on January 4, 1802, brought the repeal of the 1801 Act to the
forefront of congressional debates.187 He compiled caseload data and aimed to prove that
the newly created judgeships were unnecessary. 188 Furthermore, Senator Breckenridge
argued that Congress¶ ability to create new courts also implied its authority to abolish those
same courts.189 He concluded that Congress had the right to rectify the mistakes of its
predecessors.190
Federalists, on the other hand, contended that it would be blatantly unconstitutional
to repeal the 1801 Act.191 This argument hinged on the constitutional provision that gave
federal judges life tenure during good behavior.192 Because the circuit judge positions had
already been created, and judges already appointed, Federalists considered the removal of
the positions a clear violation of the life tenure provision of the Constitution. 193
Congress fervently debated the repeal of the 1801 Act until a majority, consisting of
Anti-Federalists, succeeded in returning the federal judiciary to its prior structure under
the 1789 Act.194 The Anti-Federalists, in the Judiciary Act of 1802 (³1802 Act´),
eliminated the circuit courts the year after their creation and, for the only time in history,
revoked the tenure of federal judges.195 The Anti-Federalists claimed they were not
³legislatively removing the judges´ but rather ³abolishing the courts.´196 Justice Samuel
Chase, unimpressed by this reasoning, stated that ³[t]he distinction of taking the Office
from the Judge, and not the Judge from the Office´ was ³puerile and nonsensical.´197
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

WOOD, supra note 119, at 420.
Lowell H. Harrison, John Breckenridge: Western Statesmen, 18 J. SOUTHERN HIST¶Y 137, 142 (1952).
Id.
Id.
Id. Senator Breckenridge clarified that he:

could not agree that a judge could hold an office once it ceased to exist, and he found nothing
unconstitutional in his proposals. If some judges were unable to perform circuit duty, they should be
allowed ³to return to that state of tranquility and retirement, from which they must have been no doubt
reluctantly drawn.´
Id. at 142±43.
191. Id. at 143. Governor Morris ³led the Federalists in defense of the existing bill. Once established, they
contended, a court was inviolate. Morris hoped that the Supreme Court would take a part, if necessary, to save
the Constitution.´ Id. Discussion earlier in this Comment, regarding the case of Stuart v. Laird, shows that
Morris¶ desire for Supreme Court involvement was satisfied, but the result was not at all what he had hoped. See
supra notes 103±08 and accompanying text.
192. See Harrison, supra note 187, at 142±43; see also U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
193. Harrison, supra note 187, at 142±43.
194. Id. ³[Breckenridge] denied the power of a court to declare unconstitutional an act of Congress; each
branch of government had exclusive authority in its own sphere. On Wednesday, February 3, as twilight darkened
the windows, the bill passed the Senate 16-15, and the House concurred a month later.´ Id. Breckenridge¶s denial
of a court¶s ability to strike down legislation as unconstitutional is an interesting precursor to the landmark
decision in Marbury v. Madison, decided one year later in 1803. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1 Cranch
1803).
195. WOOD, supra note 119, at 420±21.
196. Id. at 421.
197. Id. Chief Justice John Marshall agreed with Justice Chase¶s viewpoint. However, Justices Cushing and
Patterson, as well as President Washington, thought it best to accept the new legislation anyway. Marshall
accepted this, and he himself returned to circuit riding as the Judiciary Act of 1802 required. In one instance,
Chief Justice John Marshall forgot to pack a pair of pants, so ³[h]e had to sit in judgment, covering his legs with
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The judges who had been appointed to the circuit positions created in the 1801 Act,
only to have those positions done away with a year later in the 1802 Act, petitioned
Congress as to the constitutionality of their judgeships being removed. 198 Congress then
referred the judges¶ petition to a committee.199 The committee recommended that the
Attorney General file a quo warranto against one of the circuit judges, so that the nature
of the circuit judgeship could be judicially considered.200 The quo warranto suit was never
filed, likely because President Jefferson¶s Attorney General lacked sympathy for the
Federalist circuit judges¶ plight.201 Therefore, the constitutionality of repealing the 1801
Act was never considered, despite the doubts held by justices of the highest Court about
the constitutionality of the legislature¶s actions.202
iii. Legislation Aimed Directly at the Circuits Is Not Immune from Politicized
Federalism.
Throughout the Nineteenth Century, Congress continued to pass politically
motivated judicial acts that altered the judiciary in a variety of ways. While Jefferson still
occupied the presidency in 1807, the Seventh Circuit Act (³1807 Act´) was ratified and a
new seat on the Supreme Court created.203 The total number of justices went from six to
seven, and the additional justice would ride circuit in the newly created Seventh Circuit.204
Kentucky, Tennessee, and Ohio were all included within the Seventh Circuit boundary,
and these states proved challenging for justices traveling westward in an expanding
nation.205 The Seventh Circuit Act required the Supreme Court justice presiding over the
Seventh Circuit to reside within the boundaries of that jurisdiction. 206 This is the only
instance in the judiciary¶s history of a residency requirement having been imposed on a
Supreme Court justice, a requirement that appealed to Anti-Federalists who sought a close
connection between federal politicians and local communities. 207
The Tenth Circuit Act of 1863 (³1863 Act´) raised the number of circuit courts to
ten and the total number of Supreme Court justices to ten as well. 208 The Tenth Circuit
established in 1863 was not the same Tenth Circuit that exists today. 209 The 1863 Act

his robe.´ RICHARD BROOKHISER, JOHN MARSHALL: THE MAN WHO MADE THE SUPREME COURT 85 (2018).
198. Surrency, supra note 132, at 64.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. See
Landmark
Legislation:
Seventh
Circuit,
FED.
JUD.
CTR.,
https://www.fjc.gov/history/legislation/landmark-judicial-legislation-text-document-3 (last visited Nov. 4,
2019); see generally Seventh Circuit Act, ch. 16, 2 Stat. 420 (1807).
204. Landmark
Legislation:
Seventh
Circuit,
FED.
JUD.
CTR.,
https://www.fjc.gov/history/legislation/landmark-judicial-legislation-text-document-3 (last visited Nov. 4,
2019).
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Tenth Circuit Act, ch. 100, 12 Stat. 794 (1863); Stanley & Russell, The Political and Administrative
History of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, 60 DENV. L.J. 119, 119 (1982).
209. Stanley & Russell, supra note 208, at 122.
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included California and Oregon, states currently included in the Ninth Circuit.210 Congress
abolished the Tenth Circuit three years after its creation and redistributed the states in its
jurisdiction among the other nine circuits.211 Subsequently, any other states that joined the
Union were also assigned to one of the existing nine circuits.212
The abolition of the Tenth Circuit was achieved through the Judicial Circuits Act of
1866 (³1866 Act´), only a year after the conclusion of the American Civil War. 213 The
legislation provided for a total of nine circuit courts, and it expressly listed the states to be
included within each circuit¶s jurisdiction.214 In a major departure from the 1863 Act
passed three years prior, California and Oregon were included under the Ninth Circuit¶s
purview, where they remain today.215 In its passage of the 1866 Act, a majority Republican
Congress, primarily concerned with post-war reconstruction efforts, refused to give
President Johnson, an opponent of the reconstruction effort, the opportunity to appoint a
Supreme Court justice.216 Thus, Congress designed the 1866 Act to prevent that
outcome.217 To do this, Congress specified that no new appointments could be made to
the Supreme Court until the Court¶s membership had been reduced, by justices¶ deaths or
resignations, from nine to seven.218
The jurisdictional boundaries set forth in the 1866 Act have remained largely the
same for over 150 years.219 Congress has subsequently only adjusted the boundaries to
include new states in existing circuits and to divide two large circuits.220 The 1866 Act
was part of the Republican Party¶s broader goal of lessening the disproportionate
representation of southern states prior to the American Civil War.221 Before the war began,
five of the nine circuits were composed entirely of slave states. 222
iv. Politicized Federalism Continued Influencing the Federal Courts Throughout
the Nineteenth Century.
In 1891, the Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, William Evarts,
introduced legislation that would address an overwhelming caseload in the federal
judiciary, similar to the modern crisis of volume.223 At a time when the Supreme Court
210. Id.
211. Id.; see Judicial Circuits Act, ch. 210, 14 Stat. 209 (1866).
212. Stanley & Russell, supra note 208, at 122.
213. Id.; see Judicial Circuits Act, ch. 210, 14 Stat. 209 (1866).
214. Stanley & Russell, supra note 208, at 122.
215. Id.
216. David P. Currie, The Reconstruction Congress, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 383, 432 (2008).
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Landmark Legislation: Reorganization of the Judicial Circuits, FED. JUD. CTR.,
https://www.fjc.gov/history/legislation/landmark-judicial-legislation-text-document-7 (last visited Dec. 1,
2019).
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. James L. Oakes, Chief Judge of the Second Circuit, Address at the Centennial Celebration of the Evarts
Act and the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (June 13, 1991), in 46 REC. ASS¶N B. CITY
N.Y. 480, 482 (1991). Evarts had been President Lincoln¶s second choice to succeed Chief Justice Taney in 1864,
but instead, he would become the United States Attorney General. Id.
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had 1600 cases awaiting its attention, Evarts understood that the highest Court needed
relief.224 Evarts sympathized with the overburdened judiciary, and he led the legislative
effort to provide a remedy for its ailment. 225
The Judiciary Act of 1891 (³1891 Act´) created the United States Circuit Courts of
Appeals.226 The new circuit courts were given appellate jurisdiction over cases heard by
the federal district courts, and new circuit judgeships were created, thus eliminating the
need for justices of the Court to continue their circuit riding duties. 227 Evarts¶ legislation
established the Circuits as they are today and was one of the farthest-reaching judicial
reforms in American history, as it re-delegated around three-quarters of the Supreme
Court¶s jurisdiction to the newly created United States Courts of Appeals.228 In total, over
100 years passed between the time the federal courts were instituted and the abolition of
circuit riding came to fruition.229
Later, the Judicial Code of 1911 (³1911 Act´) was enacted and primarily intended
to re-codify the laws pertaining to the judiciary, which are now found in Title 28 of the
United States Code.230 Outside of that primary function, the 1911 Act also unburdened
the Circuits of their trial jurisdiction.231 Since the Circuits no longer possessed trial
jurisdiction, the perception of potential unconstitutionality faded from the federal courts,
at least insofar as the same judge could no longer hear a case at both the trial and appellate
levels.232
In a subsequent effort to lessen the caseload of the Supreme Court, the Judiciary Act
of 1925 (³1925 Act´) gave the Court the option of ³deciding not to decide´ by designating
the writ of certiorari as a means by which the Court could either grant or deny review of
cases.233 After the 1925 Act was enacted, the vast majority of cases appealed to the
Supreme Court were denied certiorari, greatly reducing the Court¶s caseload.234 The
legislation meant that the Circuits¶ decisions carried even more importance, as they were
much less likely to be overturned by the Supreme Court.235
The 1925 Act, while reducing the Supreme Court¶s caseload, drastically increased
the caseload of the Circuits.236 As a result, the Circuits had significantly more influence
in the shaping of stare decisis.237 The Circuits have since become the courts of last resort
in 99% of cases brought before them due to increasingly restrictive rules of certiorari in

224. Id.
225. Id.
226. See Judiciary Act of 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826.
227. Judiciary Act of 1891, ch. 517, § 2, 26 Stat. 826, 826.
228. R. Bunn, Proposed Changes in the Federal Judiciary Act of March 3, 1891, 1 N. W. L. REV. 139, 139
(1893).
229. Id.
230. See generally 28 U.S.C.
231. See Judicial Code of 1911, ch. 231, 36 Stat. 1087.
232. See id. (for the statutory language that removed trial jurisdiction from the Circuits).
233. Jonathan Sternberg, Deciding Not to Decide: The Judiciary Act of 1925 and the Discretionary Court, 33
J. SUP. CT. HIST. 1, 1 (2008).
234. Id.
235. Id. at 2.
236. Id.
237. Id.
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the Supreme Court,238 and the effects of the crisis of volume have manifested more
broadly in the nation¶s jurisprudence with an infinitesimal chance of further review by the
highest Court.239
v. The Federal Judgeship Act of 1990 Is the Most Recent Example of Legislation
That Was Inadequate Because of Politicized Federalism.
The Federal Judgeship Act of 1990 (³1990 Act´) was Title Two of the Civil Justice
Reform Act of 1990.240 The legislation, now thirty years old, is the most recent example
of Congress adding judgeships to the federal courts.241 The 1990 Act provided for an
addition of eleven circuit judgeships, sixty-one district judgeships, and thirteen temporary
district judgeships.242 In the years prior to the Act¶s ratification in 1990, the Circuits¶
workload grew by approximately 30% from 1984.243
The 1990 Act was a step in the right direction, but it provided far fewer judgeships
than were sought by the judiciary.244 In 1990, Chief Justice Rehnquist thanked the
congressional leaders who made the additional judgeships possible, but he also made it
clear that there was a need for more, stating ³[w]ith our overall caseload continuing to
multiply, the judiciary will be facing a continued need for expansion of our budget.´245
The 1990 Act, with respect to the Circuits, provided about half of the judgeships that the
Federal Courts Study Committee had recommended.246 Of the twenty judgeships that the
committee had recommended, eleven were granted under the enacted legislation.247
The need for ongoing adaptation of the federal courts was at least acknowledged by
the 1990 Act, as the legislation included a provision that would require further study of
the issue.248 This further study came to fruition when the Federal Judicial Center presented

238. Stephanie K. Seymour, The Judicial Appointment Process: How Broken Is It?, 39 TULSA L. REV. 691,
691 (2004) (citing John Anthony Maltese, Confirmation Gridlock: The Federal Judicial Appointments Process
Under Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, 5 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 1, 27 (2003)).
239. Id.
240. See generally Federal Judgeship Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, STATE OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY: ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE
OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 11 (ed. Shelley L. Dowling, 1990).
246. FED. JUD. CTR., FEDERAL JUDGESHIP ACT OF 1990 ± COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 1 (1990).
247. Id. Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Joseph Biden, introducing the Judgeship Act of 1990 in
the Senate, stated:
We have taken the recommendations [of the Judicial Conference] seriously, as the Judiciary
Committee has always done. But in the end, the Judicial Conference¶s recommendations are just that±
recommendations. Nothing more, nothing less . . . I know of no other part of the Federal Government
where regional agencies call national headquarters, ask for a multi-million dollar commitment of
resources, and then are given by the Congress exactly what they want, no questions asked . . . [In the
Judgeship Act of 1990, changes were made in the Judicial Conference¶s recommendations
principally] to ensure that high-intensity drug areas get the resources they need to hear the cases,
preside over the trials and sentence those who are convicted.
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY UNITED STATES SENATE ON S. 2648,
at 28 (1990) (illustrating the way in which temporary political motivations affect the support that the judiciary
receives from Congress).
248. Federal Judgeship Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650. In Chief Justice Rehnquist¶s 1990 Report of the
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a report titled ³Structural and Other Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals´ to
Congress in 1993.249 The report discussed several threats to the judicial process that
scholars and judges had identified, and it also suggested structural alternatives to remedy
those threats.250 Despite the enormous amount of resources that were dedicated to the
production of that report, no significant alterations to the judicial structure, or addition of
judgeship positions, were implemented following its release. 251
C. Constitutional Silence and Politicized Federalism Have Always Been the True
Culprits.
Politicized federalism has affected the judiciary in largely the same way throughout
all of American history.252 Whether it be the struggles of the early Court in abolishing
circuit riding or the contemporary crisis of volume, the same roadblock impedes the federal
judiciary when it seeks adaptation of the courts to keep up with an evolving caseload.253
This roadblock results from the inherent characteristics of the legislature and the judiciary,
as well as the powers possessed by each.254 As the Constitution instructs, Congress
legislates in response to an ever-present need for new policy, while the Circuits and
Supreme Court naturally look at those same laws in retrospect.255 With one branch passing
laws in anticipation of policy needs and the other branch reviewing those laws after the
fact, some degree of tension will inevitably result, but this tension was expected and
desired by the Constitutional Convention.256 Beyond that desired degree of tension,
politicized federalism increased the strain exponentially. 257
In the founding of the nation, the concept of federalism was viewed as a compromise
rather than a perfect solution for either the Federalist or Anti-Federalist party
individually.258 The government established under the Articles of Confederation had left
each state to act as its own sovereign entity and not a cohesive union, which led to a variety
of problems.259 However, the Founding Fathers had not forgotten the consequences of an
all-powerful centralized government either; the Declaration of Independence serves as an
immortal reminder of that sentiment, as its language repeatedly rebuked the tyranny that
resulted from a single entity, the King of England, possessing exclusive authority to
State of the Judiciary, he thanked Senator Joseph Biden and Representative Jack Brooks, the respective chairmen
of the Senate and House Judiciary Committees at that time, for their leading roles in enacting the Federal
Judgeship Act of 1990. REHNQUIST, supra note 245, at 9.
249. See generally FED. JUD. CTR., STRUCTURAL AND OTHER ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS OF
APPEALS (1993).
250. See generally id.
251. Id.
252. Supra Part II.B.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. See U.S. CONST. arts. I, III.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Loren P. Beth, The Supreme Court and American Federalism, 10 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 376, 378 (1965).
259. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781; see also THE FEDERALIST No. 6, at 21 (John Jay) (Am. Bar
Ass¶n ed. 2009) (³To look for a continuation of harmony between a number of independent, unconnected
sovereignties situated in the same neighborhood would be to disregard the uniform course of human events, and
to set at defiance the accumulated experience of ages.´).
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govern.260 Another compromised aspect of an experimental government, federalism was
a calculated hypothesis of how best to delegate authority, and the branches of government
were its variables.261 It was apparent early on that the judiciary would not be isolated from
the uncertainty of the experiment.262
Federalism contributed in a tangible way to the strained relationship between the
early courts and Congress.263 The Court, as the supreme interpreter of laws, proposed the
elimination of circuit riding and the creation of intermediate appellate courts, as the court
system established under the 1789 Act had been impractical and the administration of
justice strained.264 Congress ignored those pleas for over a century because it was
politically advantageous to keep the status quo or politically unworkable to do
otherwise.265
The perpetual feud between Federalists and Anti-Federalists rages on today.266 The
Federalists and Anti-Federalists identify themselves under different names but hold largely
the same ideals.267 The Democratic Party advocates for similar policy considerations as
Federalists did centuries earlier, such as an emphasis on centralized government to regulate
when state governments are inadequate to handle national issues.268 Similarly but
conversely, the Republican Party holds many of the same foundational views as the AntiFederalists, such as minimizing the federal government¶s reach and states having a broader
authoritative role.269 Whatever names the political parties attribute to their platforms, the
effects of their partisan differences on the judiciary remain largely the same. Two centuries
ago, justices of the Supreme Court endured cross-country travel because they were
mandated to do so, despite the swarm of concerns surrounding the circuit riding
practice.270 Today, the Circuits endure an overwhelming caseload because Congress has
not addressed the crisis of volume, despite judicial requests for legislative relief. 271
260. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776) (³The history of the present King of Great Britain
is a history of repeated injuries and usurpations, all having in direct object the establishment of an absolute
Tyranny over these States.´)
261. See generally Beth, supra note 258.
262. Id.
263. See supra Part III.B.ii.
264. See generally Glick, supra note 31.
265. See supra Part III.B.i±ii.
266. See generally Republican Platform, GOP, https://www.gop.com/platform/ (last visited Dec. 9, 2019)
(³Government should be smaller, smarter and more efficient´); Party Platform, DNC,
https://democrats.org/where-we-stand/party-platform/ (last visited Dec. 9, 2019).
267. See sources cited supra note 266.
268. See generally DNC, supra note 266.
269. See generally GOP, supra note 266.
270. Supra Part II.B.
271. Infra Part IV. Politicized federalism can appear in the relationship between a State and Congress as well.
In October of 2015, Arizona¶s Governor wrote a letter to Speaker of the House, Paul Ryan, and Senate Majority
Leader, Mitch McConnell, requesting that legislation be considered to remove Arizona from the Ninth Circuit¶s
jurisdiction. Letter from Governor Douglas A. Ducey to Speaker of the House Paul Ryan and Senate Majority
Leader Mitch McConnell (Oct. 30, 2015) (accessible at https://azgovernor.gov/governor/governor-duceys-letterhouse-speaker-ryan-senate-majority-leader-mcconnell). The State of Arizona has been frustrated in recent years
with, inter alia, the Ninth Circuit¶s caseload (14, 076 pending cases, nearly three times greater than the next
largest circuit), Supreme Court reversal rate (77%), and average disposition time (fifteen months). Id. In his letter,
Governor Ducey cited calls for reform of the Ninth Circuit by Supreme Court Justices Byron White and Sandra
Day O¶Connor. Id. Justice White had stated that ³[t]he volume of opinions produced by the Ninth Circuit¶s Court

Published by TU Law Digital Commons,

25

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 56 [], Iss. 1, Art. 7

TULSA LAW REVIEW

134

[Vol. 56:109

Comparing the early practice of circuit riding with the modern crisis of volume, it is
clear that both threatened²and the latter continues to threaten²the effectiveness of the
judiciary in administering justice.272 The federal courts reached out to Congress in
response to both judicial ailments and sought remedies that would allow them to
administer justice more effectively.273 However, then and now, Congress has proven
inadequate to help the courts in a timely manner.274
IV. THE ³CRISIS OF VOLUME´ IS THE LATEST EXAMPLE OF AN OLD INFECTION.
The ³crisis of volume´ is a multifaceted issue with an array of potential solutions;275
however, the most effective solutions to a problem can only be identified when informed
by analysis of the root cause. The root cause of the crisis of volume can be gleaned from
the way the infection has repeatedly manifested itself throughout the history of the
judiciary.276 The practice of circuit riding that strained the early Circuit jurisdictions, and
the modern crisis of volume currently weighing down the Circuits, are one in the same. 277
When the same infection plagues the same victim and causes the same symptoms since
the time the victim was born, the only logical conclusion is that the infection must stem
from a fundamental flaw in the victim¶s DNA; in this instance, that fundamental flaw is
the absence of a provision for judicial adaptation in Article Three of the Constitution. 278
In the absence of that provision, attempts to adapt the courts by legislative means have
been rendered ineffective due to politicized federalism.279
A. The Report of the Federal Courts Study Committee Addressed the Problem Thirty
Years Ago.
In 1990, the Federal Courts Study Committee (³Study Committee´) issued the
Report of the Federal Courts Study Committee (³1990 Report´) and declared that the
Circuits¶ caseload had reached a state of crisis, threatening the ³hallmarks of our
judiciary.´280 The Study Committee described those hallmarks to include that:
judges do most of their own work, grant oral argument in cases that need it, decide cases
with sufficient thought, and produce opinions in cases of precedential importance with the
care they deserve, including independent, constructive insight and criticism from judges on
the court and the panel other than the judge writing the opinion.281

of Appeals and the judges¶ overall workload combine to make it impossible for all the court¶s judges to read all
the court¶s published opinions when they are issued.´ Id. However, despite several calls for restructuring the
Ninth Circuit, such a reform has proven politically unpalatable in Congress thus far.
272. See generally Glick, supra note 29; Markey, supra note 23.
273. Supra Part III.C.
274. Id.
275. George D. Brown, Nonideological Judicial Reform and Its Limits – The Report of the Federal Courts
Study Committee, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV 973, 973 (1990).
276. Supra Part III.B±C.
277. Supra Part III.C.
278. See U.S. CONST. art. III.
279. Supra Part III.C.
280. FED. CTS. STUDY COMM., supra note 2, at 109.
281. Id.
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With first-hand experience handling the burgeoning caseload, Judge Miner, of the
Second Circuit, gave remarks in 2013, in which he stated that ³Congress ha[d] failed to
act effectively in responding to the µmajor structural or procedural options¶ identified in
the [1990] Report.´282 Judge Miner is not the only judge to proclaim in recent years that
the ³crisis of volume´ is alive and well today, but, thirty years later, the solutions offered
in the 1990 Report have yet to be attempted.283 In light of these judges¶ first-hand
knowledge regarding the crisis, paired with the truth that crises are meant to be addressed,
the issue must±again±be examined.
The judiciary should be able to adapt efficiently in response to an ever-evolving
caseload, but Article Three offers no efficient apparatus for such a purpose.284 The federal
courts have had little alternative but to request Congress¶ assistance, but the history
surrounding those requests suggests that the congressional avenue is inadequate. 285 One
commentator points out that ³the only dialogue is between the Court and law review
writers. Perhaps Congress will step in, but this is likely to happen in the context of a
specific issue . . . rather than as part of an overall look at the federal courts.´286
Unfortunately, such a multifaceted problem cannot be addressed by the occasional
correction of one facet individually.287 Further complicating the issue, truly meaningful
reform would implicate partisan considerations.288 Thus, politicized federalism enters the
conversation.289
³An ideological approach to federal judicial reform emphasizes basic systemic value
issues such as balancing the need to vindicate national authority against claims of some
form of state sovereignty . . . ³290 In the early years of the American Republic, federalism
penetrated all aspects of political discussion, and the judiciary was not immune from the
effects of partisan interests.291 One prime example discussed earlier in this Comment,
Thomas Jefferson and John Adams passionately fought against each other to see their
visions of the federal judiciary realized in the judicial acts of 1801 and 1802.292
The politicization of judicial issues is inherent within the design of the American
government, and politicized federalism manifesting itself within the context of judicial

282. Miner, supra note 4, at 552±53.
283. Id.
284. Supra Part III.A.
285. See supra Part III.B.; see also JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR., STATE OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY: ANNUAL
REPORTS OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 1, 3 (2013)
I would like to choose a fresher topic, but duty calls. The budget remains the single most important
issue facing the courts . . . We in the Judiciary recognize what should be clear to all: The Nation needs
a balanced financial ledger to remain strong at home and abroad. We do not consider ourselves
immune from the fiscal constraints that affect every department of government. But, as I have pointed
out previously, the independent Judicial Branch consumes only the tiniest sliver of federal revenues,
just two-tenths of one percent of the federal government¶s total outlays.
Id.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.

Brown, supra note 275, at 994.
Id.
Id. at 974.
Id.
Id.
Supra Part II.B.
Supra Part III.B.ii.
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adaptation is not, in and of itself, a problem. However, when politicized federalism
manifested itself within the void of uncertainty created by constitutional silence, a serious
illness began to spread. This illness, commonly referred to as the ³crisis of volume,´
damages the judiciary in often intangible ways and gradually harms the system of justice
that the Founding Fathers envisioned over two centuries ago.293
In its 1990 Report, the Study Committee presented an ultimatum for the judiciary¶s
future.294 Contemplating how changes in the appellate courts might be brought about, the
Study Committee queried, will those changes be ³insidious and unplanned; will oral
argument and reasoned opinions simply fade away . . . [o]r will Congress and the courts
fashion new structures and procedures specifically designed to preserve the hallmarks of
our judiciary?´295 Unfortunately, three decades have passed since the 1990 Report, and
the Study Committee¶s questions have been answered; the changes were ³insidious and
unplanned.´296
B. What Is the Current State of the “Crisis of Volume?”
The American population has consistently grown since the founding of the nation.297
Generally, this has meant a corresponding increase in cases filed in the federal courts. 298
In 1790, immediately following the ratification of the 1789 Act, estimates of the
population were around 3.9 million.299 In 1800, one year prior to the controversy
surrounding the acts of 1801 and 1802, the population was estimated at around 5.3
million.300 Jumping forward to 1890, one year before circuit riding was abolished, the
population had grown to about 63 million.301 In 1920, five years before Congress gave the
Supreme Court the power to deny review of cases, the population was estimated at around
118 million.302 In 1990, the year Congress last added judgeships to the Circuits, the
population was estimated at 248 million.303 As of 2010, the population was estimated at
309 million,304 and the current estimate in 2019 is 330 million.305
While it seems like common sense that rises in population would result in increases
of litigation, not all have accepted that connection as factual.306 Some commentators point
to the overall decrease of federal filings in recent years as evidence that the crisis has
faded; however, one group of individuals has more first-hand experience with caseload
trends than any other±the judges that hear the cases±and judges have made it clear that the
293. FED. CTS. STUDY COMM., supra note 2, at 109.
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES 1789±1940, at 25 (1949).
298. See Thomas B. Marvell, Caseload Growth–Past and Future Trends, 71 JUDICATURE 151, 151 (1987).
299. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 297, at 25.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1990 CENSUS OF POPULATION GENERAL POPULATION STATISTICS 1.
304. 2010 Census, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/decennialcensus/decade.2010.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2020).
305. Population Clock, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/ (last visited Dec. 2, 2019).
306. Marvell, supra note 298, at 151.
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crisis of volume is alive and well despite the recent decrease in filings. 307 While the overall
number of appeals has decreased slightly in recent years, the filings have still increased by
about 20% since the 1990 Report was released. 308 A close examination of case
management statistics reveals alarming trends that indicate the crisis has deepened since
the 1990 Report.309
Certain statistics relate directly to those ³hallmarks of our judiciary´ as described by
the Study Committee in its 1990 Report.310 The first of those hallmarks was that ³judges
do their own work.´311 Since 1990, there has been a 15.2% increase in procedural
terminations of cases by staff rather than by judge. 312 The Study Committee identified
another hallmark, that judges ³grant oral argument in cases that need it.´313 In 2018, cases
were terminated on the merits without oral argument 24.9% more often than they were in
1990.314 The Study Committee further stated that judges should give each case the amount
of time and thought it deserved.315 In 2018, the use of unpublished opinions had increased
by just under 20% since the 1990 Report.316
In light of these particularized statistics, it is obvious that the infection persists, even
despite the slight decline of appeals in recent years. 317 But what do those statistics mean
for the day-to-day functions of the Circuits? About half a century ago, the federal appellate
process looked drastically different.318 In 1988, Chief Judge Markey of the Federal Circuit
lamented the deterioration of the ³personally conducted´ federal appellate process:
As performed as recently as twenty years ago, the personally conducted federal
appellate process comprised: (1) review of the record and briefs by the judge; (2) oral
argument of thirty or forty-five minutes on a side; (3) preparation by the judge of a written
opinion; (4) assistance in each chambers by one elbow law clerk and one secretary; and (5)
frequent and adequate conferences of the judges on the cases.
As performed today, the bureaucratically conducted federal appellate process
comprises: (1) screening and track-setting by staff attorneys; (2) review of records and briefs
by a law clerk or a staff attorney; (3) oral argument in less than one third of the cases, and
then for fifteen or twenty minutes on a side; (4) preparation of opinions by law clerks and
staff attorneys; (5) dispositions without opinions in two-thirds of the cases; (6) assistance in
each chambers by three law clerks and two secretaries and assistance to all chambers by a
corps of staff attorneys; and (7) infrequent, short judicial conferences on the cases. In sum,
all appellate opinions were once the product of judges; today most are the product of an

307. See Miner, supra note 4; see also Markey, supra note 23.
308. U.S. CTS., U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS ± CASES FILED, TERMINATED, AND PENDING (SUMMARY) tbl.2.1
(Sept. 30, 2018).
309. Id.
310. FED. CTS. STUDY COMM., supra note 2, at 109.
311. Id.
312. U.S. CTS., supra note 308.
313. FED. CTS. STUDY COMM., supra note 2, at 109.
314. U.S. CTS., supra note 308.
315. FED. CTS. STUDY COMM., supra note 2, at 109.
316. U.S. CTS., supra note 308.
317. Id.
318. Markey, supra note 23, at 376.
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institution.319

The ever-increasing caseload, in a manner similar to tactics of attrition warfare,
overpowered the ³personally conducted´ federal appellate process, and, since Congress
rendered no aid, the Circuits succumbed to unjustifiable means of dispensing justice. 320
Judge Markey concluded that ³[t]he churning, feverish effort to µkeep up¶ has saved the
µsystem¶s¶ façade;±but lost its soul±a judge with fully adequate time to contemplate, think,
write and re-write.´321
In hearing appeals from the federal district courts, the Circuits play a pivotal role in
maintaining American jurisprudence by stare decisis.322 State courts are often persuaded
to follow precedent established in their respective circuit, and federal district courts are
obligated to do so, but the development and quality of this precedent is hindered when the
Circuits are overburdened.323 Tragically, the crisis overwhelmed the Circuits to such an
extent that an evolution of the judicial process was unavoidable. 324 Without congressional
intervention, each Circuit had no choice but to adapt in ways that were reactive rather than
proactive.325 The harmful effects of this ³insidious and unplanned´ evolution have
undoubtedly hampered the production of quality stare decisis in the Circuits.326
Each Circuit reacted to its caseload in unique ways.327 For example, the Second
Circuit and Ninth Circuit each implemented starkly contrasting strategies for keeping up
with their cases.328 Both the Second Circuit and Ninth Circuit dealt with the judicial chaos
that followed the 9/11 attacks and the ensuing increase of immigration cases.329 The
Second Circuit ensured that each litigant in those cases was allowed time for oral
argument, but the Ninth Circuit allowed less than 10% of litigants the chance to present
oral argument.330 The Second Circuit maintained its reputation for upholding the right to
oral argument of every litigant, at the cost of reducing its reversal rate. 331 The Ninth
Circuit, with the largest appellate caseload of all, significantly limited its allowance of oral
arguments, and a reduction in its reversal rate did not occur.332
This was only one instance of a seemingly endless number of ³circuit-specific
tradeoffs´ that developed as judges coped with the crisis of volume.333 These
individualized methods of adaptation developed out of necessity rather than careful
consideration or forward-thinking strategy, and each circuit-specific tradeoff reflects the

319. Id. at 376±77.
320. Id. at 377.
321. Id. at 379.
322. Sloan, Amy E., The Dog That Didn’t Bark: Stealth Procedures and the Erosion of Stare Decisis in the
Federal Courts of Appeals, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 713, 718±19 (2009).
323. Id.
324. Markey, supra note 23, at 377.
325. Id.
326. Id.
327. Lavie, supra note 20, at 68±69 (discussing what Lavie calls ³divergent reaction´ in various circuits).
328. Id. at 82.
329. Id. at 91.
330. Id. at 88.
331. Id. at 82.
332. Lavie, supra note 20, at 88.
333. Id.
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unique circumstances of the particular Circuit that implemented them. 334 While each
Circuit dealt with the crisis in unique ways, the overall effect of the infection remained the
same.335 Judges became less involved, law clerks and staff attorneys were relied on more
heavily, and published opinions were issued with substantially less frequency.336
The judge¶s role in the new era of the federal appellate process looks nothing like it
did just a few decades ago.337 As Judge Markey explained, ³the judicial process at the
appellate level has been replaced by the judicial process . . . the reputations of appellate
judges and courts turn today on fast processing±on µgetting the cases out¶±not on personal
scholarship, memorable elucidation, or clear, forward thinking.´338 In response to the
overwhelming volume of cases, the judiciary implored Congress to help with the crisis,
just as it had centuries earlier with the practice of circuit riding, but Congress again sat
idly by while the judiciary suffered.339 As a result, ³personal, deliberative judicial
decisionmaking´ dissipated, and the modern appellate process became an institutionalized
conveyor belt of justice.340
C. The Death of the “Personally Conducted” Federal Appellate Process Must Be
Mourned if It Is Ever to Be Born Again.
The Founding Fathers would likely scoff at the modern federal appellate process.341
Federalist Paper No. 78 offers some insight into the founders¶ intentions for the judicial
process:
If, then, the courts of justice are to be considered as the bulwarks of a limited
Constitution against legislative encroachments, this consideration will afford a strong
argument for the permanent tenure of judicial offices, since nothing will contribute so much
as this to that independent spirit in the judges which must be essential to the faithful
performance of so arduous a duty.
This independence of the judges is equally requisite to guard the Constitution and the
rights of individuals from the effects of those ill humors which the arts of designing men, or
the influence of particular conjunctures, sometimes disseminate among the people
themselves, and which, though they speedily give place to better information, and more
deliberate reflection, have a tendency, in the meantime, to occasion dangerous innovations
in the government, and serious oppressions of the minor party in the community . . . But it is
easy to see that it would require an uncommon portion of fortitude in the judges to do their
duty as faithful guardians of the Constitution, where legislative invasions of it had been
instigated by the major voice of the community.342

As Alexander Hamilton stated in the above passage, a judge¶s role requires
independence, time for contemplation, and fortitude against the erosion of constitutional
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Markey, supra note 23, at 378.
See The Federalist No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
The Federalist No. 78, at 453 (Alexander Hamilton) (Am. Bar Ass¶n ed. 2009).
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values.343 Federal judges were intended as a sword in the sheath of the minority.344
Hamilton spoke of a government in which an often unwieldy bicameral legislature
succumbed to the momentary desires of its constituents, and, as the path to hell is often
paved with good intentions, the fortitude of independent judges was meant to protect
against the irrationality of the temporary.345
This Comment does not seek to degrade the work of federal judges as if they have
forsaken their guardianship of the Constitution; rather, it is intended to illustrate the way
judges have been hamstrung in their efforts.346 The judges were once the sole mechanism
by which the judiciary functioned, and they were allotted ample time to perform their
tasks.347 In dealing with the crisis of volume, judges had no choice but to delegate work
to their staffs, and the ample time they once had was reduced to the bare minimum
necessary to keep up with the cases. 348 The nature of justice speaks for itself on the
seriousness of this issue. It calls to mind an image of the blindfolded woman, balancing
her scales with the utmost care and contemplation. Justice cannot become synonymous
with a conveyor belt.
If the crisis of volume is cured and the ³personally conducted´ appellate process
successfully restored, that will not be the end of the judiciary¶s predicament.349 The DNA
of the patient is still flawed; the Constitution still does not provide the judiciary with an
efficient apparatus for adaptation.350 As stated earlier, the judiciary needs its own immune
system to ward off recurring attacks. Whether it be the practice of circuit riding or the
crisis of volume, history has consistently demonstrated the inability of the judiciary to
adapt with the needs of the present day.351 But what does a judicial immune system look
like?
An immune system must be able to identify and neutralize threats against the body
it protects. The identification of threats has not been the primary issue, as judges, scholars,
and the legal community all naturally monitor the federal courts for these potential issues;
however, once those threats are identified, the judiciary has consistently been unable to
neutralize them.352 Article Three¶s silence and politicized federalism created a twopronged dilemma: (1) at what point has the judiciary crossed a threshold beyond which it
is no longer healthy, and (2) what is the most efficient method for remedying the ailments
that initially pushed it beyond that threshold to begin with?
Both of these prongs are addressable, regardless of political ideology, by simply
drawing a line in the sand that the hallmarks of the judiciary must never fall below. The
statistical data that is released each year, in conjunction with warnings from judges, is
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sufficient to identify when the judiciary is threatened.353 But the identification of the
problem is only one half of an immune system¶s responsibility. For effective response to
an identified threat, there must be a clear threshold at which lawmakers are required to act,
irrespective of partisan considerations.
The ³hallmarks of our judiciary´ erode away when the workload of judges becomes
too strained, and while the intangible sanctity of the judicial process is hard to measure,
statistics and first-hand experience of judges are more than sufficient to inform lawmakers
of the need for action.354 The reports addressing the crisis of volume illustrate this
reality.355 All that is truly needed to complete the judicial immune system is an
enumeration of the thresholds that cannot be crossed. For example, if a Circuit reaches ³x´
number of cases per judge, lawmakers must address the issue. These thresholds would be
simple measures of judicial capacity, and, when that capacity is exceeded, assistance must
be rendered if the judicial ³hallmarks´ are to avoid erosion.356
The legislature must be persuaded to implement these thresholds if the fundamental
flaw in the judiciary¶s DNA is ever to be remedied, and the remedy must be tailored in
such a way as to avoid the perpetual debate in congress that is politicized federalism. All
that is required to understand the need for such thresholds is a bipartisan respect for the
judiciary, and, in theory at least, that should still exist.
V.

CONCLUSION

This Comment was never intended to set forth specific methods for addressing the
caseload of the United States Courts of Appeals. Other authors, cited throughout, have
spoken to the specific needs of the judiciary in addressing the crisis. 357 However, this
Comment does aim to inform the implementation of potential solutions by describing the
root causes of the infection plaguing the courts today. Furthermore, it should illustrate that
the current appellate process is dysfunctional.358 A crisis ignored does not go away, and
the American judiciary may remain short-circuited indefinitely without the aid of those
who cherish it enough to find a cure for its ailment.
Statistics indicate that the ³hallmarks of our judiciary´ continue to erode further the
longer the crisis of volume spreads without cure.359 The current generation of law students
will be oblivious to the ³personally conducted´ appellate process that once existed, as the
³bureaucratically conducted´ appellate process has become the norm.360 Unfamiliar with
a history that is rarely discussed, students are unaware of how prevalent oral arguments
used to be, how direct the link was between a judge¶s own work and the opinions they

353. See generally FED. CTS. STUDY COMM., supra note 2; Miner, supra note 4; Markey, supra note 23; U.S.
CTS., supra note 308.
354. See generally sources cited supra note 353.
355. See generally FED. CTS. STUDY COMM., supra note 2; FED. JUD. CTR., supra note 249; U.S. CTS., supra
note 308. See also generally COMM¶N ON REVISION OF THE FED. CT. APP. SYS., STRUCTURE AND INTERNAL
PROCEDURES: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE (1975).
356. FED. CTS. STUDY COMM., supra note 2, at 109.
357. See generally Miner, supra note 4; Markey, supra note 23.
358. Markey, supra note 23, at 371.
359. FED. CTS. STUDY COMM., supra note 2, at 109.
360. Markey, supra note 23, at 376±77.
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produced, and how published opinions used to be more common than unpublished.361 This
generation of law students will begin their careers ignorant of the fact that the Circuits¶
boundaries were last drawn in 1866, when the Ninth Circuit was mostly unsettled
territory.362 The legacy of those judges that endured the circuit riding practice has mostly
been forgotten, and the burden of the current judges is largely overlooked. 363
The federal court system was flawed from the time of its inception, as Article Three
provided no efficient method for necessary adaptation or expansion of the judiciary. 364
Subsequent legislation has failed to address the judiciary¶s symptoms, and the weakened
state of the judicial body has become the norm.365 The failure of Congress to support the
judiciary stems from the manifestation of politicized federalism in the relationship
between the two branches.366 The harmful effects of the judiciary¶s current state are too
significant to be accepted as the norm, and the hallmarks of the judiciary must be
fortified.367 Once the judiciary is returned to a healthy state, legislative action must be
taken to ensure that those judicial hallmarks never fall below stated thresholds of health
again.368 And for the love of the judiciary, Congress should put partisan differences aside
when considering legislation aimed at preserving the judicial hallmarks. 369
- Adam Heavin*
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